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Overvi ew 
The Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the meaning of the law in the 
United States.  For this reason, nominations and confirmations of Justices to the Supreme 
Court of the United States have always been an important process.  By being able to 
distinguish the confirmation processes for these nominees from one another, a more 
complete comprehension of the nomination process as a whole will further the 
understanding of the court, as well as its interactions with the other branches of the 
American government.  The objective of this thesis is to compare and contrast the 
confirmation processes of Justices Roberts and Alito, exploring the reasons why the 
senate roll call vote for the two justices were so different, even though both candidates 
were confirmed.  Justice Roberts was confirmed 78-22, while Justice Alito was 
confirmed by a 58-42 vote.  What accounts for this startling 20-vote difference in the 
senate’s voting?  Essentially, the central hypothesis of the thesis is that several factors 
contributed to the greater divisions surrounding Alito’s confirmation versus the relative 
consensus by which Roberts was chosen, despite the fact that both are considered to be 
strong conservative judges.  These factors include the character and personality of the 
nominees, the timing of their nominations, judicial philosophy, the record created by their 
prior written opinions, interest group politics and the political balance on the court at the 
time of their nominations.  These factors will be examined in relation to the voting 
patterns in the two confirmation processes.  Also, an examination of nominations through 
the perspective of George Watson and John Stookey’s study titled “Supreme Court 
Confirmation Hearings: a view from the Senate” will be conducted in order to place 
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Senators in their situational roles and corresponding goals during the nomination and 
confirmation processes.   
 This study will first present background information on the nomination process as 
a whole.  It will explore past nomination processes and the now highly publicized and 
politicized nature of the confirmation hearings.  Both nominees will then be viewed and 
analyzed in terms of their legal careers and within the context of the factors discussed 
above.  Following will be an in-depth examination of the senate roll call vote.  More 
specifically, senators will be placed into six categories:  
1). Republicans voting “yes” on both nominations (54) 
2). Democrats voting “no” on both nominations (22) 
3). Republicans voting “no” on both nominations  (0) 
4). Democrats voting “yes” on both nominations (4) 
5). Democrats voting differently on the two nominations (19) 
6). Republicans voting differently on the two nominations (1) 
 The first two categories of senators are the expected modes of voting and thus will 
require less explanation than the remaining categories.  Not surprisingly, no Senators 
meet the criteria of category 3.  Most of my analysis will focus on categories four through 
six, as these are the most intriguing and should be examined in greater depth.  
Independent Senator Jeffords’ votes will be also taken into consideration and, for 
purposes of this research; he will be treated as a Democrat since he caucused with the 
Democrats.  Further analysis will be conducted examining the relationship between 
Senate party affiliations and actual votes cast. In order to place the justices into their 
respective liberal or conservative ideologies, data will be examined from past studies in 
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which the voting patterns of each justice in his circuit court behavior were analyzed.  
These ideologies will be related to the examination of the Senate roll call votes and, in 
particular, to those Senators who fall outside the mode of the roll call data.  A chart 
summarizing the roll call voting data will be included with the discussion 
(http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
09&session=1&vote=00245 and 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
09&session=2&vote=00002).   
To better understand the Senate roll call, interviews were conducted with several 
actors involved in the confirmation process, including staff members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and representatives of interest groups such as the Alliance for 
Justice.  Also, I will have access to interviews that were conducted by my thesis advisor, 
Dr. Elliot Slotnick, in Washington D.C. as well.  By collecting information from primary 
sources, including the congressional record, in depth knowledge can also be used to 
enhance the examination of the Senate roll calls on both justices.  
 The analysis will conclude with a detailed case study of Rhode Island Republican 
Senator Lincoln Chafee and his decision to vote “yes” on Chief Justice Roberts and “no” 
on Justice Alito.  Senator Chafee’s vote is especially interesting due to the fact that he 
was the only Republican to vote differently on the two nominations.  Other case study 
examinations of those senators who fell outside of the mode of data will focus on Senator 
Jeffords, who voted yes on Roberts and no on Alito, Democratic Senator Byrd, who 
voted yes on both nominees and Democratic Senator Leahy, who voted yes on Roberts 
and no on Alito. 
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 An analysis of primary source material will be used as the chief methodology in 
the research process.  These materials include Senate confirmation hearings (questions 
and answers), interviews with various players in the confirmation process, congressional 
record statements made by the senators themselves and an analysis of the partisan voting 
behavior.  News media coverage will be used as a secondary source and will help to 
further understand the senators’ actions and the reasons for their votes.  
 
Nomination Process Background 
 For purposes of this paper, a background discussion of the Supreme Court and its 
powers is useful.  Article III of the United States Constitution states “The judicial power 
of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish” (US Constitution, Article III, 
Section 1).  Thus, the federal court system is established with these words.  However, the 
only component established in this legal system is the Supreme Court; all others are left 
to the discretion of Congress.  Left to similar discretion are issues such as the size of the 
court itself; today, eight associate justices and one chief Justice make up the nine 
members of the court.  Originally, the court was made up of six members (Maltese 22).  
The Supreme Court is a unique legal body in that it has the distinct power of having both 
original and appellate jurisdiction.  Congress, however, has the power to limit the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Court as it sees fit.  The Court is also unique in that it has the 
ability to select which cases it wishes to hear.  The court, in effect, sets its own policy 
agenda.  By granting writs of certiorari, the Justices are able to leave their stamp on 
American history and decide upon those cases that they deem most important to 
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American society.  Given these characteristics, it is easy to understand the importance 
and power of the court.   
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court has not always been 
viewed as a glamorous body with substantial power.  In fact, the first Supreme Court 
Chief Justice, John Jay, left the court to pursue a more esteemed career as the governor of 
New York.  In the 1803 decision of Marbury v Madison, the Supreme Court gained the 
respect and the authority that it holds today when Justice Marshall developed the concept 
of judicial review, allowing the court to review the constitutionality of the actions of 
other branches.   
The nomination and confirmation process as a whole is structured by the 
Constitution’s advice and consent clause.  Specifically, the clause states “The President . . 
. shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all 
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law…”.  (US Constitution Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 2).  The advice and consent clause was a compromise between those 
who favored the appointment power being lodged exclusively in the executive and those 
who favored the appointment power being lodged exclusively in the Senate.  Arrived at 
by the Philadelphia Convention delegates, it ensures that when a vacancy arises on the 
court, the President and Senate must work together in order to fill it (Epstein and Segal 
8).  Hence, the Advice and Consent clause explains how there has long been a debate in 
American politics concerning the judicial confirmation processes while establishing the 
inherent tensions between the two branches.   
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Since the late 1960’s, five Supreme Court nominees have failed to be confirmed 
(Maltese 139).  Moreover, to date, the Senate has failed to confirm 27 out of the total 147 
Supreme Court nominees, equating to roughly 18% of all nominees (Epstein and Segal 
20).  Henry Abraham states, “a number of candidates were rejected because of Senate 
opposition to the nominating chief executive” (Abraham 28).  Tied to this statement is the 
notion that the nomination and confirmation process is political and can be examined in 
terms of an internal tension between political parties.  Epstein and Segal explain how 
Senators who feel that the nominee’s judicial philosophy or political views are 
incompatible with theirs will even risk going against the actions of their party in order to 
fulfill the wishes of their home state constituents (Epstein and Segal 2). Republican 
Lincoln Chafee’s decision to vote “no” in the senate roll call confirmation vote of Justice 
Alito is an example of such a departure, and will be examined in a case study in the 
following pages.   
Prior to the current confirmation scheme, other plans were considered.  The 
original confirmation process proposed for the court was part of the Virginia Plan, which 
included an appointment by both the Senate and House (Maltese 19).  Lower court 
nominees are also nominated and confirmed by the Senate, however little attention is 
focused on their confirmation due to their local and regional organization (Goldman 1).    
Under Article II Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the President holds the 
power to appoint nominees to the court (Maltese 10).  Maltese further asserts that 
nominations as a whole may be a test of presidential strength and that in general, 
presidents who are considered “weak” have a more difficult time of securing 
 7
confirmation (Maltese 5).  Furthermore, “Presidents now use judicial appointments as 
part of their growing arsenal of resources for influencing public policy” (Maltese 160).   
In terms of the two confirmation battles we are focusing on for Justices Roberts 
and Alito however, a “weak” characterization of President Bush does not explain the 
differences in the roll call.  The confirmation process of a potential justice begins when 
the President’s advisors investigate and compile a list of potential nominees.  These 
advisors include the President’s chief of staff, the attorney general, and other top officials 
(Segal and Spaeth 179). The opinions of interest groups and other legal professionals as 
to who should be nominated are often expressed to the Department of Justice and sent on 
to the President’s staff (Segal and Spaeth 180).  This list is almost always comprised of 
potential nominees who are members of the President’s political party (Abraham 48).  
This partisan party nomination has been characterized as being “nothing wrong in a 
president’s attempt to staff the court with jurists who read the constitution his way”  
(Abraham 328).  Moreover, vacancies on the bench can serve as a means for a president 
to leave his mark on American history.  The President takes into account several factors 
in the nomination process.  Henry Abraham cites three factors that are influential in the 
selection process.  These factors include 1). The American Bar Association, 2). The 
Supreme Court Justices currently on the bench, and 3). The public and private interests in 
the process (Abraham 18).  In addition, Segal and Spaeth include factors such as 
ideology, political environment, region, religion, race, sex, experience and patronage 
(Segal and Spaeth 184).   While the constitution does not specify any qualifications for 
being a member of the court (Maltese 18), all justices of the Supreme Court have or had 
their Juris Doctorates (Abraham 35).   
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The nomination and confirmation process continues when the nominees are then 
sent questionnaires about their personal lives and careers that are then sent to the 
Department of Justice, as well as, historically, to the American Bar Association.  Also, 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts a background check on the nominees, 
ensuring that there are no criminal pasts associated with them.  After evaluating the 
questionnaires, the ABA issues a formal report on the nominees.  It is important to note 
that these formal reports do not focus on the nominee’s political philosophy.   Instead, 
these reports are designed to only evaluate the nominee’s professional standing and 
fitness as a federal judge (Epstein and Segal 71).   
Historically, the Presidents have relied on the ABA for its rating of potential 
justices as “well qualified”, “qualified” and “not qualified”.  It should be noted that both 
Justice Roberts and Alito received “well qualified” ratings, even though their Senate roll 
call votes were substantially different (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10707788/).  
Moreover, since Eisenhower’s presidency, less than 1.5% of nominated judges have been 
given a “not qualified” rating by the ABA (Epstein and Segal 71).  Thus, most of the 
nominees are viewed as qualified, even though some are not confirmed.   
Recently, there have been some changes in the American Bar Associations role in 
the nomination and confirmation process.  Our current President, George Bush, has not 
relied on the ABA and has even terminated the ABA’s role in the 
confirmation/nomination process by not releasing the name of his nominees in advance to 
the association (Epstein and Segal 74).  It is important to note, however, that presidents of 
both dominant political ideologies have had their differences with the American Bar 
Association (Maltese 128).  Hence, prior to President Bush’s term in office, The 
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American Bar Association would issue a full formal report on the nominee.  After the 
issue of a formal report by the American Bar Association, the nominee is then questioned 
by the Senate Judiciary Committee in a formal hearing setting.  The committee then 
votes, and if the nominee passes this stage, he/she is sent to the Senate for a full vote 
(Epstein and Segal 21).  At the full Senate vote, Senators who are opposed to the nominee 
may attempt to filibuster the nominee in the hopes of preventing a full vote on the floor 
(Epstein and Segal 98).  When questioned, nominees often do not fully answer the 
questions directed at them from the senators.  For example, Judge Frankfurter would not 
directly answer the questions directed at him during his hearings in regards to his alleged 
communist involvement (Maltese 106).  Both Justices Alito and Roberts were accused of 
dodging questions, although Justice Alito had more of a judicial record to account for and 
was thus more likely to be characterized by Senators and interests groups with providing 
inaccurate responses.   
Leading up to the confirmation vote, President’s often use their staff in an effort 
to influence Senators and their votes (Maltese 117).  These votes are available to the 
public, which in turn could be an influence on a Senator’s confirmation vote (Maltese 
53).  Further, change in the Senate Procedural rules in 1929 allowed for debate over the 
nominations on the open Senate floor, which has contributed to the increased 
involvement of interest group activity (Maltese 37).  Full votes can range anywhere from 
a landslide to a close call.  For example, Justice Ginsberg’s confirmation vote was 96-3 
(Maltese 98).  In contrast, Justice Thomas was confirmed with a vote of 52-48, which 
was the closest margin of vote of the 20th century 
(http://www.supremecourthistory.org/myweb/justice/thomas.htm).   
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The judicial confirmation process has always been political, despite the idea that 
the judicial branch is politically independent from the two remaining branches of 
government.  The mobilization of public support is key in respect to all the players in the 
process (Maltese 86).  Moreover, Maltese asserts that political motivations were even 
present in the confirmation process as far back as the 19th century (Maltese 31).  
Specifically, they came into the realm of judicial confirmation in 1881, although they 
have had the most involvement since the 20th century (Maltese 37).  Epstein and Segal 
attribute this quality to the fact that justices themselves are political and that the 
appointment process is characterized by ideological and partisan concerns (Epstein and 
Segal 4).  Recently, the confirmation process of the court has become more politicized 
and publicized.  The first public hearings for nominations occurred in 1916 with the 
confirmation of Justice Brandeis.  Also, to date, these hearing have been longer in length 
than they were previously.  In addition, the media is playing a larger role in the 
confirmation process than it historically has.  Moreover, testimony by nominees has only 
been televised since 1981 (Maltese 93).   
Also tied to the increase of politics and publicity are the role of interest groups in 
the confirmation process.  Thus, there is much more public concern over the confirmation 
and nomination processes, which adds to importance placed on nominees in the 
processes.  The roots of interests groups and their roles in the judicial confirmation 
process can be traced back to sometime shortly after the civil war (Maltese 22).  Interest 
groups formed in an effort to promote or contest a nominee in accordance with the 
organization’s core beliefs and values.  Examples of such groups today include the 
Alliance for Justice and People for the American Way on the left and the American 
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Conservative Union on the right.  These organizations attempt to use the media as a tool 
to provide the public and other governmental actors with information on judicial 
nominees.  The groups even compile reports that are later published for the public 
outlining key cases and voting tendencies of the justices.  (See, for example, 
www.afj.org.)  Often included in these reports are politically charged statements 
concerning the nominee’s character in relation to how he/she will rule on the federal 
bench.   
The first example of successful interest group blocking of a nominee occurred in 
1881.  Stanely Matthews was unsuccessful in this confirmation due in some part to the 
efforts of the interest group the Anti Monopoly League.  Prior to this example, interest 
groups voiced concerns over their distaste for a nominee through letters to the President 
(Maltese 52).  Another prominent and more recent example of interest group involvement 
and opposition of a nominee can be seen with President Reagan’s nomination of Robert 
Bork.  The People for the American Way, Alliance for Justice, Women’s Legal Defense 
Fund and other groups strongly contested the confirmation of Judge Bork.  By attacking 
his prior judicial decisions, these groups were able to draw attention to personal character 
qualities in Bork’s opinions and his extreme conservatism that many Americans found 
disturbing and incompatible with American values.  Even though these groups alone did 
not independently defeat Judge Bork, they certainly played a role in his failure to be 
confirmed (Segal and Spaeth 196).   
Since the failed confirmation of Robert Bork, interest groups have played a role in 
the process by voicing their concerns through the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings 
(Maltese 92).  Indirectly, Justice Alito’s confirmation can be examined in relation to 
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Robert Bork’s.  Both judges had confirmations that centered around the replacement of a 
“swing” vote on the court (Maltese 139).  Examples of other past failed nominees include 
Douglas Ginsburg, G. Harrold Carswell and Clement Haynesworth (Segal and Spaeth 
191).  Most recently, we have the failed nomination of President Bush’s White House 
Counsel, Harriet Meiers.    
The Alliance of Justice has also published reports on both Justices Roberts and 
Alito during their confirmation processes.  The interest groups report on Justice Alito 
characterized him as a judge who “has aggressively sought to curb Congress’ legislative 
authority to tackle issues of national importance…” (Alliance for Justice Preliminary 
Report 1).  By attacking Justice Alito’s actions and past rulings, interest groups can be 
influential by simply bringing cases and issues to the attention of Senators and the 
American public as a whole.  An analysis of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
in relation to these political interest groups will be conducted in the following pages.      
 
Chief Justice John Roberts 
 On September 9, 2005, Chief Justice Roberts was sworn in after being nominated 
by our current President George W. Bush and being confirmed by the Senate 
(http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf).  He replaced the 
conservative Republican Chief Justice Rehnquist whom he formerly served as a law 
clerk.  Chief Justice John Roberts is the youngest man in over 200 years to be confirmed 
to the Supreme Court as Chief Justice.  Moreover, “Roberts received more Senate votes 
supporting his nomination (78) than any other nominee for Chief Justice in American 
history” (http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/uscourtsystem/a/bioroberts.htm).  The correlation 
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between Roberts’ young age and historic Senate support is peculiar in that justices, as 
mentioned previously, are appointed for life terms.  One would think that with a nominee 
so young in age and with limited judicial experience, as well as a conservative ideology 
and reputation, much more opposition from the Senate would have occurred.  Moreover, 
both Roberts and Alito are viewed as members of the ultra-conservative wing of the 
Republican Party, so one would assume that Senators from the left would oppose a 
nominee more strongly who could potentially leave their stamp on American judicial 
proceedings for many years to come.  Empirical research compiled by Jeffrey Segal 
supports this notion that both nominees are conservative in nature.  Segal rated the 
Justices on a scale from 0 to 1.0 in terms of their political ideology.  0 is the most 
conservative, whereas 1.0 is the most liberal.  Roberts has a score of .120 and Alito has a 
score of .100, making the two not substantially different in political ideology.  A table 
illustrating Segal’s work can be found on the next page. 
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Supreme Court Justices Segal/Cover Scores 
          
 
Justice 
 
Ideology Score 
 
 
Rehnquist 
 
 
.045 
 
 
O’Connor 
 
 
.415 
 
Ginsburg 
 
 
.680 
 
Breyer 
 
 
.475 
 
 
Kennedy 
 
 
.365 
 
Souter 
 
 
.325 
 
Stevens 
 
 
.250 
 
Thomas 
 
 
.150 
 
Roberts 
 
.120 
 
Alito 
 
.100 
 
  *Information obtained from http://ws.cc.stonybrook.edu/polsci/jsegal/qualtable.pdf  
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Roberts was born in Buffalo New York in 1955 and obtained his law degree from 
Harvard Law School.  Although Roberts did not have lengthy experience as a judge prior 
to being confirmed to the Supreme Court, he has held numerous governmental and 
private positions in the legal field.  He was former Chief Justice Rehnquist’s law clerk, as 
well as Principle Deputy Solicitor General.  In the few years before he was appointed and 
confirmed to the high court, Roberts practiced law for the Hogan and Hartson Law Firm 
and ultimately was appointed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.  He 
also has extensive experience arguing before the Supreme Court on behalf of the federal 
government and as a private litigator.   
It has been asserted by players in the confirmation process on Capital Hill that 
Justice Roberts’ support in the Senate roll call can be attributed in part to his personality 
and character.  For example, in an interview conducted with a Republican Senate aid 
revealed that the Senate Democrats did not really want to vote for Roberts, but that they 
almost somehow had to due to the fact that it was difficult to vote “no” on a nomination 
like Roberts.  Specifically, the aide labeled Roberts’ personality as polished (Interview 
3/23/3007).  Further, the aide stated that Senators and the legal community “fell in love” 
with Roberts during his speeches and individual lunches with members of the Senate.  
The aide dubbed him as poetic and further described how Roberts had the ability to 
sweep people up with his simple use of words.  Roberts’ ability to captivate an audience, 
whether it be simply a single senator or the Senate as a whole, was a major key in his 
support in the roll call votes (Interview 3/23/2007).   
Members of the interest group Alliance for Justice, which opposed Roberts, also 
cited his personality and character as having been essential in gaining more support from 
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the Senate than that of Alito.  For example, President of Alliance for Justice Nan Aron 
stated that Roberts was the “darling of the Washington legal establishment.  The press 
liked him, the lawyers liked him…” and that he was “…smart, very engaging, handsome, 
well spoken.  Senators were impressed by what the lawyers had to say about him.” (Nan 
Aron Interview 3/21/2007).  Further, Vice President of the organization, Paul Edenfield, 
explained how Roberts was popular among the Washington D.C. legal community and 
that this popularity played a role in the outcome of the Senate roll call votes.  Edenfield 
further clarified how “no one denied he was a nice guy”.   In comparison, due to the fact 
that Judge Alito had been serving on the third circuit court for fifteen years, he had been 
outside the Washington D.C. community and the elite legal field within it.   This absence 
from the community ultimately caused Judge Alito to lack the same popularity among 
these elite lawyers.  These elite lawyers, Edenfield explained, had influence over the 
Senate.  As a result, Alito did not have the same support than Roberts had (Paul Edenfield 
Interview 3/21/2007). 
Justice Roberts was originally nominated to replace the retiring Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor.  However, the sudden death of Chief Justice Rehnquist allowed President 
Bush to nominate Roberts to the Chief Justice position, thus opening up two vacancies on 
the Court (http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/05/roberts.nomination/index.html).  
By replacing a justice who is characterized as a strong conservative, the political 
composition of the Court was only marginally affected by his confirmation.  This 
situation is different from the one Alito encountered, which accounts for some of the 
differences in the roll call votes.  Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor, who was 
referred to as the “swing vote”.  Thus by replacing a swing vote with a conservative vote, 
 17
Bush had the opportunity to shift the balance of power on the makeup of the Court.  
Manning describes this relationship when he states “…in many ways O’Connor’s 
departure allowed Bush the opportunity to have an even greater impact on the Court by 
giving the President the chance to replace a crucial swing vote on the bench” (Manning 
2).  Although empirical evidence is not available to support this assertion, the speculation 
can be made that Roberts would have in fact faced greater opposition if Chief Justice 
Rehnquist had not died and instead, he was nominated to replace Justice O’Connor.   
The charts below summarize the voting tendencies of Justices Rehnquist and 
O’Connor in civil rights issues.  They were obtained from the Supreme Court Database 
compiled by Harold Spaeth.  The charts show the percent of the time that the justices 
voted liberally or conservatively in all civil liberties cases from the 1981 to the 2005 
terms.  Frequencies of liberal and conservative votes were run in the area of civil liberties 
issues due to the fact that civil liberties are an area of law in which types of votes (liberal 
and conservative) weigh heavily in the outcome cases.  By looking at the charts, one can 
see that O’Connor and Rehnquist had different voting records and that Rehnquist (77.1%) 
voted substantially more often in a conservative direction than O’Connor did (65.3%) 
(Harold Spaeth Database).  Related to these findings from the Spaeth database are the 
Segal cover scores of both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor.  These score 
illustrate the clearly different voting records and ideologies of both Justices.  Segal gave 
O’Connor a score of .415, while giving Rehnquist a score of .045.  Thus, there is a clearly 
substantial difference in the two and their replacement with the two new nominees would 
cause some concern. 
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TABLE 1: % CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL VOTES CASE BY JUSTICES 
REHNQUIST AND O’CONNOR IN CIVIL LIBERITIES CASES FROM THE 
1981-2005 
  
% Liberal Decision 
 
% Conservative Decisions 
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist 
 
22.9% 
 
77.1% 
 
Justice O’Connor 
 
34.7% 
 
65.3% 
 
*Information obtained from Harold Spaeth Database. 
 
Due to his credentials and limited amount of time served on the Washington D.C.  
Circuit Court of Appeals before he was nominated (two years), most of the opposition 
that came from Democratic Senators focused on extracting whatever aspects of Roberts’ 
political ideology from the judge’s sparse judicial voting records that they could.  
However, Roberts undoubtedly has ties to and identifies with the Republican Party, 
which is expected due to President Bush’s political party affiliation.  Due to this limited 
judicial voting record, opponents of Roberts knew that they would have great difficulty in 
rallying support for his defeat.  They instead, as shown with the differences in the role 
call, focused their attention and prepared for a new nomination.  This attention was 
channeled to Alito and his substantial conservative circuit voting record.  Moreover, Paul 
Edenfield, when interviewed, stated that one of the main differences for the divergence in 
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the Senate roll call votes between the two justices was due to the fact that Roberts lacked 
a public record while Alito had a fifteen year one.  Further, Edenfield asserted that 
Alito’s fifteen year record allowed for the interest group to characterize him with more 
ease due to the fact that the record allowed for clear voting patterns to be extracted (Paul 
Edenfield Interview 3/21/2007).  
Kenneth Manning’s study on the ideology of Justice Roberts uses the justice’s 
past rulings on cases to group Roberts’ positions into categories.  Overall, Manning’s 
findings show that Roberts is “…very conservative in his decision making in criminal 
justice disputes, and the data suggest that he is exceptionally conservative in civil 
liberties and rights cases.  In labor and economic disputes, however, Judge Roberts has 
been more liberal than the appellate court average” (Manning 1).  The pie graphs below 
were obtained from Kenneth Manning’s study titled How Right is He?  A Quantitative 
Analysis of the Ideology of Judge John Roberts.  The graphs illustrate Justice Roberts’ 
conservatism with the percentage of liberal and conservative decisions made by Roberts 
in different case types. 
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE DECISIONS BY 
JUDGE JOHN ROBERTS IN THREE CASE TYPES 
 
 Criminal Justice % Civil Rights & 
Liberties % 
Economic Activity 
& Labor Regulation   
% 
Liberal 13.6% (6) 15.4% (2) 55.7% (39) 
Conservative 86.4% (38) 84.6% (11) 44.3% (49) 
U.S. Ct. of Appeals 
Average Percentage 
Conservative Votes 
79.2% 58.8% 48.3% 
 
Odds Ratio (a) a= 1.66          a = 3.85               a = .85 
 
N’s reported in parenthesis 
* The number of civil liberties and rights cases by Roberts is too low to make statistically 
valid comparisons.  Data are presented for reference purposes. 
** Chart obtained from Kenneth Manning’s How Right is He?  A Quantitative Analysis of 
the Ideology of Judge John G. Roberts 2005. 
    
 
Half of the Democrats (22) voted to confirm Roberts, which reflects a belief of 
Senators that he was not as far to the right as seen in the subsequent voting of Judge 
Alito.  Tied to this is Manning’s findings that Roberts is not as conservative in economic 
and labor disputes as the average appellate court judge.  Furthermore, during Justice 
Roberts’ work for the private law firm Hogan and Hartson, Justice Roberts was involved 
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in the case Lawrence v. Texas (539 U.S. 558) in which he did pro bono work for a gay 
rights group.  Manning also asserts that Roberts has had a history of backing away from 
issues such as school prayer and abortion, which can be viewed as hallmarks of the right 
(Manning 5). 
Interest groups, as mentioned previously, play a major role in the confirmation 
process.  Both the Alliance for Justice and People for the American Way have published 
reports and voiced opinions over Justices Roberts and Alito.  However, both groups 
appear to be harsher in their evaluations of Alito compared to Roberts.  This can be 
attributed to the lack of prior court decisions and replacement of a conservative Chief 
Justice Rehnquist with a roughly equal conservative Justice Roberts.  Specifically, the 
Alliance for Justice addresses this issue in their preliminary report when they assert, 
“Judge Roberts’ limited public record raises concern” 
(http://www.allianceforjustice.org/research_publications/research/john_roberts_ 
report.pdf, 1).  Overall, The Alliance for Justice portrayed Roberts as a successful 
Republican who raised some concern.  People for the American Way also voiced 
concerns over the limited amount of cases that Judge Roberts had participated in.  They 
do, however, refer to him as hostile and conservative. (http://media.pfaw.org/roberts.pdf, 
1).  The group also mentioned that Justice Roberts was quiet during his hearings.  
However, as mentioned previously, both groups could not provide as much evidence in 
their reports due to his lack of time spent on the federal bench.   
Lastly, an examination of the environmental factors and Presidential strength 
surrounding Justice Roberts’ confirmation is useful in ruling out possible influences in 
the process that might account for the differences in the roll call votes.  The graph below 
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displaying President Bush’s approval ratings illustrates the similarity in approval ratings 
in both September 2005 (Roberts’ confirmation) and January 2006 (Alito’s 
confirmation).  Thus, the argument cannot be contended that the difference in the roll call 
votes is attributed to a difference in Presidential strength or popularity.   
 
         ** Chart obtained from http://www.hist.umn.edu/~ruggles/Approval.htm. 
 
Possible environmental influences that could account for the difference in the 
votes can also be examined in the context of Presidential strength.  For example, if 
several events were occurring that could potentially effect the political environment, it 
would, in theory, be easier or more difficult for the President to secure a confirmation.  
One major event that occurred in September 2005 was Hurricane Katrina.  This event is 
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particularly important to the notion of possible environmental influences due to the fact 
that the American public was devastated over this natural disaster.  Although no 
empirical evidence supports this claim, one can speculate that this disaster may have 
enabled Justice Roberts to get confirmed with more ease than his colleagues.   
Specifically, with the attention of the nation focused on the hurricane and its destruction, 
the President was able to send his nominee through the Senate confirmation process with 
ease.   
Moreover, a statement by Senator Leahy supports this argument.  Specifically, in 
Leahy’s statement on the nomination of Roberts he explained “Fewer than 36 hours after 
the announcement of the passing of Chief Justice Rehnquist and during the horrific 
aftermath in the week following Hurricane Katrina, the President withdrew that July 19 
nomination to be Associate Justice.  Thereafter, the White House sent us this alternative 
nomination, for Judge John Roberts to become the Chief Justice of the United States, and 
I cooperated with Chairman Specter in an accelerated consideration of the nomination” 
(http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200509/092105.html).   The war on terror is another event 
that can be examined in relation to the confirmation process.  One would think that a 
disapproval of the war from at least some of the American public would affect Bush’s 
confirmation.  However, it does not explain the differences in the roll call votes seeing as 
that it was still occurring from September 2005 to January 2006.  
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Justice Samuel Alito Jr. 
 Justice Samuel Alito was born April 1st 1950 in Trenton New Jersey.   His 
educational background includes a bachelor’s degree from Princeton University and a 
law degree from Yale University.  In terms of political ideology, Dana Bash explains,  
“legal experts consider Alito a solid conservative” 
(www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush.index.html 3).  Unlike Justice 
Roberts, Alito had extensive experience serving on the bench.  Moreover, this extensive 
experience on the bench has been used as evidence to support the claim that Justice Alito 
was actually a more qualified Justice than his colleague Chief Justice Roberts.  In the 
interview mentioned previously with an aide to a Republican Senator, the aide stated that 
Alito’s experience on the bench made him more qualified to be a Justice than Roberts 
(Interview 3/23/2007).  Specifically, he had a 15-year tenure on the federal Court of 
Appeals serving the 3rd Circuit.    Prior to his service on the bench, Alito was a clerk for 
Judge Garth on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals.  Along with his work on the 3rd Circuit, 
Alito has also served as the US attorney for New Jersey’s district, Assistant Solicitor 
General and Deputy Assistant Attorney General.  
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/judicialnominees/alito.html).  On January 31st, 2006 
Judge Samuel Alito was sworn in as the 110th Justice to the Supreme Court.  Most 
importantly, Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor, who has been dubbed by many as 
the moderate swing vote (http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/31/alito/index.html).   
For purposes of examining statements concerning opposition to Judge Alito’s 
nomination, a review of his judicial record is necessary.  Having served 15 years on the 
3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, opposition from the left was able to extract Judge Alito’s 
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judicial philosophy and stance on important issues by examining his extensive history of 
past rulings.  For purposes of this study, an examination will be conducted using data 
obtained from the Washington Posts’ article, Alito, In and Out of the Mainstream by Amy 
Goldstein and Sarah Cohen.  Specifically, the data consists of 221 divided ruling cases in 
which Judge Alito participated.  Of these 221 cases, Alito wrote 55 dissenting and 34 
majority opinions.  Overall, the pair found that “Samuel A. Alito Jr. has been highly 
sympathetic to prosecutors, skeptical of immigrants trying to avoid deportation, and 
supportive of a lower wall between church and state” 
(Http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/12/AR20051231oo328.html 1).  In areas of religion, Judge 
Alito’s record shows that he has a steady record of voting to broaden the scope of religion 
in the lives of the American public (Http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/12/AR20051231oo328.html 4).  Also concluded in the study 
was Alito’s tougher stance than that of typical appellate judges on criminal cases.  More 
importantly, however, may be Alito’s rulings on issues of civil rights.  Alito ruled against 
those claiming discrimination in 75% of the civil rights cases brought before him.  
(Http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/12/AR20051231oo328.html 1).   
Recall that Justice O’Connor, although reliably conservative, was somewhat more 
liberal on issues involving civil rights.  Therefore, with the nomination of Judge Alito, 
President Bush had the opportunity to change the political composition of the court in 
issues that the majority of the American public deems important to society.  The New 
York Times reported that “The nominee’s critics say his record as a judge, and his earlier 
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work as a lawyer in the Reagan administration, signal that he would tilt the tribunal 
further to the right, in favor of presidential power and big business and away from 
personal freedom and the rights of ordinary Americans” 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/30/politics/politicsspecial1/30cnd-alito.html).  This 
issue was also addressed in the interview conducted with Paul Edenfield with Alliance 
for Justice.  Specifically, Edenfield held that the replacement of moderate swing Justice 
with a conservative Justice played a role in Alito getting more opposition in terms of 
Senate roll call votes than Roberts did.  Further, Edenfield explained that the political 
balance on the court “was a very significant thing that people looked to” (Paul Edenfield 
Interview 3/21/2007).  Greenburg’s discussion of Alito’s confirmation also supports this 
argument.  Greenburg writes “most of the Senators who opposed Alito wanted to talk 
about the opinions that he’d written as an appeals court judge.  Casey, the abortion case, 
was the big one.  But Alito had written a number of others in areas where O’Connor’s 
vote had made a difference, especially in the area of states’ rights and criminal law” 
(Greenburg 303).    
Judge Alito’s rulings in criminal cases also provided reasons for the left to oppose 
his nomination.  Goldstein and Cohen’s investigation found that “of 33 such cases in the 
analysis, he sided with criminal defendants only three times, aligning with prosecutors 
more other than the average GOP- appointed judge in divided cases” 
(Http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/12/AR20051231oo328.html 3).  Moreover, in death penalty 
cases, Judge Alito has never voted to issue a stay or spare an inmate from execution.  
Related to this statistic is the difference in Justice O’Connor and Judge Alito’s take on 
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death penalty issues.  In the recent years before her retirement, O’Connor had been voting 
to limit use of the death penalty in cases brought to the Supreme Court (Cohen and 
Goldstein 3).     
Judge Alito’s federal appellate record, however, does resemble that of the typical 
conservative judge in some areas.  These areas include First Amendment decisions, as 
well as disagreement with the majority opinion in lawsuits by employees 
(Http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/12/AR20051231oo328.html 4).  Further, the study also 
concluded that Alito upheld the lower courts’ ruling roughly 50% of the time, which is 
also representative of judges in the Court of Appeals judges (Cohen and Goldstein 2).  
The charts and data below were obtained from Goldstein and Cohen’s study summarizing 
Justice Alito’s voting record on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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Table 3: Voting Tendencies in 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals by 
Judge Alito in Different Case Areas 
                              How Alito Voted… 
Alito Voted 
with the 
Majority 
Case Type  Split  
 
67% 
Criminal Search, 
Trial and 
Sentencing 
For Defendant 
9% 
(3) 
 
3% 
(1) 
Prosecution 
88% 
(29) 
71% Prisoners’ Rights For Prisoner 
0% 
(0) 
 
14% 
(1) 
For government 
86% 
(6) 
13% Immigration For Immigrant 
12.5% 
(1) 
12.5% 
(1) 
For government 
75% 
(6) 
 
50% 
 
Union and Wage 
Disputes 
For Union or 
Worker 
50% 
(5) 
 
0% 
(0) 
For Employer 
50% 
(5) 
 
 
 
78% 
 
Employee 
Benefit Disputes 
For Worker 
56% 
(5) 
11% 
(1) 
For 
Employer/Insurance 
Provider 
33% 
(3) 
 
 
71% 
 
 
Race, Age, Sex 
and Disability 
Discrimination 
 
For Claim of 
Discrimination 
19% 
(4) 
14% 
(4) 
Against the Claim 
67% 
(14) 
 
 
63% 
 
Government 
Regulation of 
Land use, 
Environment, 
Labor and 
Securities 
For Government 
44% 
(7) 
0% 
(0) 
For Property Owner 
or Employer 
56% 
(9) 
 
 
 
 
33% 
 
Federal and 
Congressional 
Powers (States’ 
Rights) 
For More 
Federal Power 
67% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
For Less Federal 
Power 
33% 
(1) 
 
33% 
 
Church and State For Less 
Religious 
Speech/Funding 
0% 
(0) 
0% 
(0) 
For More Religious 
Speech/Funding 
100% 
(3) 
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*N’s Reported in Parenthesis  
. 
Percentage Judge Alito Voted to Uphold Lower-Court Rulings in 183 Cases
Upheld
52%
Not Upheld
38%
Split
10%
Upheld
Not Upheld
Split
  
**Chart obtained from Amy Goldstein and Sarah Cohen’s Alito, In and Out of the Mainstream, 
January 1st, 2006 
 
As discussed previously, Justice Alito is well known to the legal and political 
community as a conservative.  Hence, President Bush’s decision to nominate 
conservative Justice Alito’s for the replacement of a moderate Justice O’Connor 
facilitated heated opposition from Democratic, as well as one Republican, Senators.    
Jeffrey Tobin describes the opposition from liberal groups as targeting Alito’s 
philosophy, specifically his anti-abortion stance, rather than his qualifications to sit on the 
court (www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush.index.html 2).  Examples of 
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opposition from other Senators on the basis of political direction of the court can be seen 
with comments from Senator Charles Schumer (D, NY).  Schumer asserts “the initial 
review of Judge Alito’s record shows that there’s a real chance that he will, like Justice 
Scalia, choose to make law rather than interpret law and move the court in a direction 
quite different than it has gone” 
(www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush.index.html 2).  This characterization 
of Alito’s actions differs than that of his colleague, Justice Roberts.  No statements were 
found characterizing Justice Roberts’ judicial philosophy in this manner.  Additionally, 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D, VT), chairman for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
characterized Bush’s actions as “instead of uniting the country through his choice, the 
president has chosen to reward one faction of his party at the risk of dividing the country” 
(www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush.index.html 2).  Moreover, Dana Bash 
asserts that Sen. Leahy’s reactions and comments to the Alito nomination were quite 
different than that of Roberts’ nomination. 
For example, the Senator asserted, "Judge Roberts is a man of integrity…I can only take 
him at his word that he does not have an ideological agenda" 
(http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050921-102702-8880r.htm).  This further 
supports the argument mentioned above that Roberts’ ability to captivate Senators was a 
key element in his confirmation.  However, both Justices are shown to be conservative, 
which further illustrates the point that the replacement of swing vote and extensive 
judicial records, as well as timing, have played roles in the opposition to Altio.  Senator 
Schumer’s comments on Roberts’ nomination were not much different than those on 
Alito.  Although not as harsh in tone, Schumer asserted that Roberts was both young and 
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brilliant and that this mix could be dangerous to the American public if Roberts judicial 
views were not firmly establised  
(http://www.dscc.org/news/latest/20050916_schumer/).  Moreover, This statement could 
be tied to the lack Roberts’ of judicial record.     
Tied to the concept of political balance on the court is the discussion of timing of 
the two nominations.  By being able to nominate two justices to the Court, the President 
may have been able to use his power to influence the Senate.  For example, by replacing 
Chief Justice Rehnquist with an equally conservative justice, Senators on the left may 
have been under the notion that the President would nominate a more moderate justice to 
replace the moderate conservative Justice O’Connor.  Instead, President Bush nominated 
a judge who was clearly just as, if not more, conservative in nature than the prior Justice 
and this, therefore, secured more opposition from the left.  With the Roberts nomination, 
he was able to obtain half of the votes from the Democratic Senators.  Left in 
disappointment, these Senators and other liberal interest groups threw all of their energy 
into defeating the President’s second nominee.  This opposition can be seen in the 
differences in the roll call votes.  Senator Leahy supports this claim with his statements 
that he made following Chief Justice Roberts’ confirmation.  Leahy stated "The next 
one's the one everybody worries about…and again, I urge, as I have before, I urge the 
president to be a uniter and not a divider" 
(http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050921-102702-8880r_page2.htm).  An 
interview with an interest group spokesperson also supports the notion that Senators felt 
that President Bush would nominate a more moderate Justice to replace Justice 
O’Connor.  The spokesperson suggested that Senator Obama inquired about the next 
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judicial appointment prior to his vote on Justice Roberts.  Specifically, he inquired that if 
he voted to confirm Roberts, would the next nomination be more moderate? Instead, the 
President nominated a strong conservative judge, which accounts for some of the  
opposition to his confirmation. 
Liberal interest groups, specifically those of environmental conservation and pro-
choice nature, also strongly opposed Alito’s nomination.  Karen Pearl, President of 
Planned Parenthood, voiced the organization’s concerns with allegations that “Judge 
Alito would undermine basic reproductive rights.  It is outrageous that President Bush 
would replace a moderate conservative like Justice O’Connor with a conservative 
hardliner” (www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/scotus.bush.index.html 3).  Their 
evidence for statements of this nature stems from a 1991 court decision in which Alito, 
dissenting alone, voted to uphold a Pennsylvania law requiring notification of the father if 
a woman was seeking an abortion (947 F 2d 682 3rd Cir. 1991).  In comparison, Pearl also 
made statements on behalf of Planned Parenthood concerning Roberts that were not as 
harsh in tone and expressed concern with the lack of knowledge of his stance on abortion.  
An example of these kinds of statements can be seen when Pearl asserted after Roberts 
was confirmed “Planned Parenthood stands firm: reproductive rights and protections for 
women's health are nonnegotiable. We will find out soon where John Roberts stands on 
the issue” (http://www.plannedparenthood.org/news-articles-press/politics-policy-
issues/judge-roberts-confirmed.htm).   
In terms of the abortion debate, perhaps more importantly is Alito’s public stance 
on Roe v. Wade.  While working as an attorney for the Department of Justice, Alito 
authored two memorandums in which he expressed his disagreement with the 1973 
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Supreme Court Case.  These memos proved to be the focus of some of the justice’s 
opposition during the confirmation process (Http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/12/AR20051231oo328.html 2).  Moreover, Alito was 
questioned on his opinions of Roe v. Wade in his confirmation hearings.  His explanation 
was that he was only “an advocate seeking a job” and that he was “…not an advocate, I 
don't give heed to my personal views, what I do is interpret the law." 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/11/15/politics/main1044170.shtml).  By publicly 
expressing his views on issues that the American public has debated for years, Judge 
Alito supplied ammunition to groups who opposed his nomination.   
Importantly, Justice Roberts’ views about abortion have also been debated in the 
political arena.  Specifically, “Judge Roberts' public positions on abortion and Roe v. 
Wade appear to be inconsistent” (http://www.issues2000.org/Court/John_Roberts_  
Abortion. htm).  Discrepancies in the Justices’ circuit court nomination hearings and his 
briefs written while employed as the principal deputy solicitor general illustrate these 
inconsistencies.  Moreover, Roberts is attributed with expressing his view that the 
American Constitution does not support abortion.  Alternatively, in his circuit court of 
appeals confirmation hearings, Roberts stated that he would uphold the Court’s ruling in 
Roe v Wade, in spite of his personal views 
(http://www.issues2000.org/Court/John_Roberts_Abortion.htm).  Also, People for the 
American Way charged “As Deputy Solicitor General during the first Bush 
administration, Roberts tried to convince the Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade in a 
case that didn’t even directly concern that issue” 
(http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=19265).  Both Justices, therefore, 
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have made similar statements on records concerning their stances on abortion.  The 
difference in roll call votes, however, in part can be attributed to the concern over the 
political balance on the court and the more substantial evidence available on Alito.  
Moreover, due to the fact that O’Connor was more moderate in civil liberty issues and 
has been a swing vote upholding abortion rights, a nomination of a conservative who has 
expressed anti-abortion remarks would raise more concern. 
Conservation and environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Earthjustice 
were another set of interest groups opposed to Alito’s nomination.  Interestingly, 
conservation groups have not opposed a judicial nomination since Robert Bork 
(Http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 2).  Justice Alito himself 
was a member of the National Environmental Enforcement Council during his time with 
the Department of Justice (http://www.supremecourtwatch.org/Alitofinal.pdf 4).  
Historically, Republican administrations have not been sympathetic towards 
environmental conservation.  Therefore, his membership in this council further supplied 
reasons for opposition of these environmental and conservation groups.  Specifically, 
over 60 conservation groups opposed the judge’s nomination to the court due to their 
concerns for protection of the environment and public health (Http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 1).  For example, Carl Pope, executive 
director of Sierra Club alleged, “Judge Alito poses a serious threat to the environmental 
protections we cherish” (Http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 
2).  In addition, “environmental groups say they fear Judge Alito’s confirmation ‘poses 
an immediate thereat to America’s commitment to protecting sage drinking water and the 
health of the vast majority of our creeks, streams, and wetlands’” (Http://www.ens-
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newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 3).  These groups alleged that in cases 
concerning these areas, Alito has had patterns of dissenting from the majority opinion.  
Pope also made statements regarding Roberts’ confirmation.  These statements, however, 
were not as severe in their characterization of the judicial correlation between Roberts 
and the environment.  For instance, Pope stated, “Although Roberts does not look like an 
ideological extremist, when faced with a close call between public health and the 
environment and economic interests, he makes the close calls on behalf of regulated 
industries” (http://www.sierraclub.org/carlpope/2005/07/judge-justice-roberts.asp).  Thus, 
Pope’s statement does address some unease with Roberts’ rulings and the environment.  
However, they do not refer to him as a “serious threat” as they do Alito.       
Opposition from these environmental groups stems from their worries that 
Congress’ ability to pass laws concerning the environment would be threatened by 
Alito’s philosophy (Http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 4).  
For example, in U.S. v. Rybar, a 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals case, Judge Alito dissented 
in a ruling found extremely troubling to environmental conservation groups because his 
placement in the Court could potentially limit the ability of Congress to protect water and 
air (http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 3).  Specifically, the 
Sierra Club charged that Alito’s judicial philosophy would threaten laws that protect 
endangered species and clean air and water (http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 4).  Alito’s judicial philosophy in terms of 
this area of the law is evident is in his past rulings and can be examined using his judicial 
record.  However, Judge Roberts has, like Judge Alito, issued troubling dissents against 
environmental protection (http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=19265).  
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The lack of equal environmental conservation opposition could possibly be attributed 
again to his short judicial record and the replacement of the former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.   
Justice Alito’s stance on the scope of federal authority also attributed to the 
difference in roll call votes.  The Boston Globe describes how the political climate in 
2006 was full of tension between Congress and the Executive Branch as a result of 
President Bush’s actions.  Specifically, President Bush “has asserted the power to hold 
prisoners without trial, shield documents, and authorize aggressive interrogations without 
congressional approval.”   Senator Kennedy’s (D, MA) remarks illustrate this inherent 
tension in relation to judicial nominations by claiming that Alito “ ‘raises concerns about 
whether he would be unduly deferential to the president’ at the expense of Congress. 'One 
of the most important issues facing the court in the future will be the extent to which it 
will enforce legal limits on presidential power, particularly in the setting of foreign and 
military affairs’”  
(http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/11/05/alito_remarks_back
ed_strong_presidential_powers/).  The Senate may view Justices that are characterized as 
deferring to the Executive branch as a threat.  Moreover, this threat can be displayed in 
the roll call votes.  It should be noted that attempts to extract statements concerning 
Justice Roberts’ stance on the scope of federal power proved inconclusive.  Therefore, he 
was considerably less vulnerable on this issue.   
As with Chief Justice Roberts, Alliance for Justice and People for the American 
Way have also published reports on Justice Alito.  However, unlike the reports published 
on Roberts, those written concerning the Alito nomination were somewhat more severe in 
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their analysis.  For example, they assert that Judge Alito has “aggressively sought to curb 
Congress’ legislative authority to tackle issues of national importance…” 
(http://www.supremecourtwatch.org/Alitofinal.pdf 1).  This tougher stance by these 
interest groups can be attributed to Justice Alito’s extensive record on the Court of 
Appeals and his replacement of a moderate conservative member of the court.  In an 
interview with Paul Edenfield, Senior Counsel for Alliance for Justice, he confirmed this 
statement in an interview.  Edenfield said that it was easier to target and oppose Alito due 
to the fact that his judicial record was so extensive (Paul Edenfield Interview 3/21/2007).  
Nan Aron, President of Alliance for Justice, explains this relationship with her statements 
following Justice Alito’s confirmation.  She asserts “Today is a sad day for our country.  
The Supreme Court makes decisions that touch the lives of all Americans.  
Unfortunately, the balance of the Court has now tilted dramatically to the right, placing 
our fundamental rights and freedom in jeopardy” (Http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/jan2006/2006-01-31-04.asp 4).    
The Prelimary Report published by Aron’s organization focused on opinions and 
dissents authored by Judge Alito during his work on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals.  An 
analysis of different types of cases are examined and published in the report.  Likewise, 
in her organization’s preliminary report on the judge, it describes how legal scholars who 
were not opposed to Justice Roberts’ nomination do not support Alito’s.  An example of 
such a scholar is Jeffrey Rosen, who charged that Justice Alito and his “…lack of 
deference to Congress is unsettling”.  Also, the report describes how National Law 
Journal characterizes Alito as being “…described by lawyers as exceptionally bright, but 
much more of an ideologue than most of his colleagues”.  With these accusations, it is 
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easy to see how they were able to create controversy and opposition to Judge Alito’s 
nomination.   
 People for the American Way also published a preliminary review of Judge Alito 
upon announcement of his nomination to the Court.  Like Roberts’ report, their report 
focused on Alito and issues concerning civil liberties and fundamental rights.  Unlike 
their characterization of Chief Justice Roberts, PFAW labels Alito as having a political 
ideology wavering to the far right.  They also assert that his opinions are troubling and 
that they “seek to undermine the established civil rights law”.  In perhaps an even bolder 
statement, they group asserts, “it is clear that Alito’s confirmation would seriously 
jeopardize Americans’ rights” (http://media.pfaw.org/stc/AlitoPreliminary.pdf 1).  The 
two reports on both nominations appear to have a somewhat different stance in tone and 
composition.  For example, they assert that Roberts’ “…record is a disturbing 
one…Roberts has limited judicial experience” and “…his record indicates that it falls far 
short of demonstrating the commitment fundamental and constitutional rights that should 
be shown by a Supreme Court nominee” (http://media.pfaw.org/roberts.pdf).  Although 
these statements are harsh in tone, they are clearly not as harsh as those made about Alito.  
Reports on Alito were also able to use his extensive record on the Court of Appeals to 
support their claims.  As discussed previously, the preceding statements support the 
argument that Justice Alito’s prior work experience, as well as his replacement of a 
moderate Republican on the bench have caused him to receive somewhat more backlash 
and opposition from interest groups than his fellow colleague.   
An analysis of environmental factors is necessary to rule out or take into account 
possible outside influences on the confirmation process as a whole.  One of these factors, 
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as was discussed in relation to Roberts, is presidential strength.  By looking at the chart 
on the preceding page, one can see that President Bush’s approval rating was in fact 
higher than it was during Roberts’ confirmation.  Therefore, one can conclude that in this 
circumstance, Presidential strength did not play a role.   
 As with the discussion of Chief Justice John Roberts and Hurricane Katrina, there 
were also situational factors that may have influenced Justice Alito’s confirmation 
process.  One of these factors that can be examined is the opposition from Democratic 
Senators of President Bush’s terrorist surveillance program.  Essentially, the program was 
used as a warrantless domestic surveillance program that proliferated heated opposition 
from the left in January 2006 (http://mediamatters.org/items/200601310002).  
Theoretically, if Senators on the left were unhappy with the President’s actions, they 
could display this disproval in their voting patterns.  Moreover, opposing Senators to 
Alito’s confirmation may have been tied to a notion of how Alito might defer to 
Presidential power to their voting tendencies.  This practice, although it does not in any 
way account for the roll call differences totally, may help to explain why only 4 
Democratic Senators voted yes on Alito, while 22 of them voted yes on Roberts.     
 There were, however, other possible outside influences that may have had a role 
in the partisan opposition.  For example, after President Bush nominated Harriet Miers as 
a replacement for Justice O’Connor, she withdrew her nomination on the speculation that 
several Republicans were opposed to it.  Meirs herself said that she was “concerned that 
the confirmation process presents a burden for the White House and its staff and it is not 
in the best interest of the country" 
(http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/27/miers.nominations/index.html).  By 
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questioning her qualifications and degree of conservatism, Republicans opened the door 
for Democratic criticism of the President’s next nomination as an attempt to fill the court 
with rigid conservative ideology in an effort to appease those on the right.  Although 
Democrats were not as opposed to Miers as those on the right were, the right realized that 
O’Connor’s swing vote seat needed to be filled with a conservative.  Republicans 
questioned Miers’ loyalty to the conservative cause, therefore possibly opening the doors 
for opposition from the left of Judge Alito’s nomination 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com /wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR20051  
02700547_2.html, Babington and Fletcher 1). 
 An interview conducted with an aide to a Republican Senator on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee further supports the argument that Meirs’ nomination had an impact 
on that of Alito’s.  However, Meirs’ nomination may have helped, rather than hindered 
his confirmation.  This aide specified that it was the media that killed Meir’s nomination, 
ultimately forcing her to withdraw.  Additionally, he stated that the Democrats were 
opposed to Alito’s confirmation, as seen with the difference in the outcome of the Senate 
roll call votes.  However, the aide stated that it has historically been difficult for two 
nominations to be opposed and defeated consecutively due to lack of motivation.  
Without the media, the Democrats had a tougher time opposing Justice Alito.  Therefore, 
some members of the Senate opposed Alito and this opposition may have been even 
greater if Meirs had not been nominated previously.  (Interview 3/23/2007).               
 Paul Edenfield at Alliance for Justice further supported this argument in an 
interview.  Edenfield explained how it was more difficult to oppose a second nomination 
for the same vacancy.  Further, he stated how it did make a difference in the nomination 
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process that Alito was in fact the second nomination (Paul Edenfield Interview 
3/21/2007).  Thus, the timing of Alito’s nomination, in this respect, may had aided him in 
the process and therefore made the gap between “yes” and “no” votes greater than it 
might have been if Miers’ had not been nominated first. 
Before an examination and discussion of the Senate Roll can occur, a summary is 
needed of the key factors that were involved in the discrepancies between Justice 
Roberts’ and Alito’s confirmation processes.  As mentioned previously, both justices are 
known to come from the extreme conservative wing of the Republican Party.  Therefore, 
the presence and combination of several key factors allowed for such a large gap in the 
Senate Roll call votes to take place.  For example, in relation to Justice Roberts, key 
factors include political balance of the court, timing, lack of judicial record, the 
perception of his character and lack of substantial situational controversy.  Also, by 
replacing a fellow conservative Chief Justice, the political ideology of the court was not 
in jeopardy.  Therefore, members of the Senate saw no reason to actively oppose Justice 
Roberts.   
Tied to composition of the court is the timing of Justice Roberts’ nomination.  As 
mentioned in the pervious pages, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death left President Bush with 
two vacancies to fill on the court.  It can be speculated that with the President’s 
nomination of a conservative, President Bush would make his second nominee more 
moderate in terms of political ideology.  The interview with Edenfield further supports 
this argument.  In the interview, Edenfield affirmed that he thought Senators may have 
thought about this factor and that it may have been taken into account in the role call 
votes (Paul Edenfield Interview 3/21/2007).  Chief Justice Roberts’ lack of extensive 
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time spent on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did not produce the same judicial record 
of that as Justice Alito’s.  This allowed his nomination to be somewhat of a question 
mark to many Senators.  Therefore, he was able to be perceived as not quite as 
conservative as his colleague.   
In terms of situational controversy, it is well known that Justice Roberts’ 
nomination did not create the same opposition as Justice Alito did.  However, this lack of 
controversy was likely due to the fact that he was the first of Bush’s two nominations.  
Moreover, Hurricane Katrina and its successful allowance of shifting the attention of the   
Senate, as well as the public, also played a role in the support for Justice Roberts’ 
confirmation.  With the nation in such turmoil over the disaster, perhaps an individual 
such as the Chief Justice would serve to bring the morale up of the citizens.  Thus, it can 
be speculated that if Chief Justice Rehnquist had not died, Justice Roberts would have 
received more opposition than he had, although it still might not have been as strong as 
that seen with Justice Alito’s confirmation.  Lastly, as mentioned in the previous pages, 
Justice Roberts’ personality can be seen as a strong influential variable in the outcome of 
the role call votes.  Nan Aron at Alliance for Justice asserted that due to his personality 
and character “Senators didn’t have the will to take him on” (Nan Aron Interview 
3/21/2007). 
Key factors and their influences on the confimation of Justice Alito include a 
substantial judicial record, political balance on the Court, and judicial philosophy.  As 
mentioned previously, Justice Alito served 15 years on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals 
before being appointed as a Justice.  This lengthy tenure allowed for an extensive judicial 
record, that was perhaps more importantly, composed of his sometimes controversial 
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written decisions.  This record also allowed for opposition, primarily from the left, with 
extraction of his voting tendencies.   
Another reason for the heated oppostion to Justice Alito’s nomination and 
confirmation was the political make up of the court at that time.  Justice O’Connor was 
seen by many as a swing vote, particularly in areas of civil rights issues.  Further, by 
replacing a moderate conservative with an staunch conservative Justice, Democrats saw 
the need to rally support in opposition of Justice Alito.  Tied to the Alito’s record is the 
extraction of his judicial philosophy, which also heavily influenced opposition from the 
left.  For example, Justice Alito’s voting tendencies reveal that he has deferred to the 
executive branch in his prior judicial rulings.  Democratic Senators who were especially 
troubled by President Bush’s actions at that time viewed Alito as somewhat of a tool of 
the President.  Likewise, they feared that he would give the President unconstrained 
power in his very decisions that they opposed, such as warrantless domestic survillence 
program.  Lastly, Justice Alito did not have the same ties to the Washington D.C. legal 
community as Justice Roberts did.  Nan Aron stated that  “Alito did not have Roberts’ 
polish, venire…” and “…he had a fifteen year record” (Nan Aron Interview 3/21/2007).  
Ultimately, these two variables proved to be a major key to Alito’s greater opposition 
than that of Roberts’ in the Senate roll call votes.           
 
Senate Roll Call 
 “With the exception to the initial announcement of a nominee’s name by the 
president, public attention to the Supreme Court nomination process is focused mostly on 
the Senate confirmation hearings.  They represent the most visible and formal evaluation 
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of the nominee’s suitability and qualifications” (Slotnick 547).  With these words, 
Watson and Stookey illustrate the importance of the Senators’ roles in the Supreme Court 
Justice confirmation process.  As mentioned in the opening pages, Watson and Stookey’s 
study can be referenced while studying the confirmation processes of both Justices 
Roberts and Alito in terms of situational controversy and the Senate roll call outcomes.  
For example, both judges attracted attention from the public, as well as the media due to 
what some saw as their controversial nominations.  Watson and Stookey explain how 
“such interest springs primarily from the uncertainty of the outcome, which derives from 
a division among the senators or from an apparent indecision by Senators concerning 
which way to vote” (Slotnick 547).  
Before an examination of the roll call can take place, background information on 
the steps taken by Senators and their staff in reaction to a Justice’s nomination need to be 
presented.  Watson and Stookey argue that these actions are instrumental in shaping the 
roles that the Senators will take during the confirmation hearing.  Examples of such 
actions are information gathering and evaluation of the political and personal 
environment (Slotnick 549).  Senator’s staff members facilitate the information gathering 
process, and “because of some presumption by the senators in favor of the president’s 
choice, attention focuses on any negative factors that might alter that presumption” 
(Slotnick 549).   
 Following the primary information gathering process, information is collected 
from official sources, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s reports on the 
nominees.  Questionnaires are also submitted to the nominee by the chief counsel on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  These questionnaires inquire about biological information, 
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general interest questions, financial data, and conflict of interest statements.  The next 
step in the process involves a pre-hearing private meeting between the nominee and the 
individual senators on the Judicial Committee.  The final steps of the Senate involvement 
process include the actual full Senate hearing, followed by Senate roll call (Slotnick 549).   
However, at the final vote, Melone asserts “What is pertinent to note, however, is that all 
the schemes point out that past nominees were evaluated on political grounds unrelated to 
professional qualifications” (Slotnick 532).  This argument is especially related to these 
two Justices due to the fact that Alito had a fifteen-year track record on the Court of 
Appeals, yet received less support in the voting stage of the process than Roberts did.  
This suggests that the Senators used other factors other than professional qualifications 
when deciding what the outcome of their votes would be.   
This political evaluation is very much present in the six categories of votes that 
will be analyzed in great detail in the following pages.  Four case studies will follow 
examining four representative Senators (Byrd, Jeffords, Leahy, Chafee) whose voting 
patterns placed them into groups three through six.  As mentioned in the opening pages, 
categories one and two were the mode of data and thus will not be examined.  
Specifically, as Melone argues, members of the Senate tend to evaluate nominees on 
political grounds.  Therefore, it is expected that Republican Senators would vote “yes” on 
both nominees and Democrats would vote “no” on both nominees.  Thus, this political 
evaluation describes why categories one and two are the represented modes of data.  
Below is a chart summarizing the six categories that the Senators fell into. 
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Roberts and Alito’s Senate Roll Call Confirmation Votes                                              
Republicans voting "yes" on both
nominations
Democrats voting “no” on both
nominations 
Republicans voting “no” on both
nominations
Democrats voting “yes” on both
nominations
Democrats voting differently on the
two nominations
Republicans voting differently on the
two nominations
 
 
 
 
Senator Robert Byrd (D - WV) 
 For purposes of analyzing Senator Byrd’s voting behavior, a short biography may 
be helpful.  Byrd was born in North Carolina on November 20, 1917.  He represents West 
Virginia and has had a lengthy career in the United States Senate.  Further, “In June 
2006, Byrd became the longest serving Senator in the history of the Republic and, in 
November 2006, he was elected to an unprecedented ninth consecutive term in the 
Senate. During his tenure, his colleagues have elected him to more leadership positions 
than any other Senator in history. Throughout his career, Byrd has cast nearly 17,800 roll 
call votes” (http://byrd.senate.gov/biography/story/story.html).  Byrd is widely known in 
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the Senate for his strong guard that he holds for the Constitution.  Lastly, he is a member 
of the Committee on Appropriations, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on 
Rules and Administration, and the Committee on Budget within the Senate.  
Senator Byrd was chosen to be a case study due to the fact that he falls outside the 
mode of data.  Specifically, Byrd is merely one of four Senate Democrats who voted 
“yes” on both Justices.  The others were Senator Conrad (ND), Senator Johnson (SD), 
and Senator Nelson (NE).  Therefore, Byrd’s case is particularly interesting.  What is 
even more startling about Bryd’s voting is the consensus among those on Capital Hill that 
Byrd is one of President Bush’s harshest critics 
(http://washingtontimes.com/national/20050721-115719-6891r.htm).  Watson and 
Stookey explain how “examination of the moderates and liberals on the committee 
confirms that those not in ideological ‘sync’ with the nominees were more likely to 
withhold support” (Slotnick 550).  Byrd, however, is not in ideological “sync” with either 
of the nominees, yet he voted to confirm both of them.  This lack of similar political 
ideology can be seen with reference to Senator Byrd’s Americans for Democratic Action 
rating.  These ratings are based on the degree of support that a particular member of 
congress gives to votes covered by this liberal oriented organization, ranging on a scale 
from 0 to 100.  Senator Byrd’s rating is a 95, making him strongly liberal and democratic 
in voting tendencies 
(http://www.votesmart.org/issue_rating_detail.php?sig_id=004110M).  Thus, the 
question as to why Senator Byrd voted “yes” on both nominees then becomes: Why?   
One answer to this puzzling voting behavior concerns the issue of home state 
constituents.  Although Senator Byrd is a member of the Democratic Party, he stated that 
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his home state of West Virginia favors conservative judges.  Seeing as though he is a 
represented governmental official, the view can be taken that it is his duty to protect the 
interests of his home state constituents.  Moreover, it is these very citizens who elected 
him into office, and therefore it seems logical that he would cast a vote that is consistent 
with the opinions of his home state populace.  Related to this idea is the importance of 
reelection in the West Virginia home that Senator Byrd represents.  For example, at the 
time of Justice Roberts’ nomination, Byrd’s home state approval rating fell below 50 
percent.  Combined with the notion that his political opponent in the state, Representative 
Shelly Moore Capito, was only three mere points behind the incumbent Senator 
(http://washingtontimes.com/national/20050721-115719-6891r.htm).  His voting on the 
two nominations, therefore, can be viewed as an effort to please his home state 
constituents, who have been shown to support the confirmation of conservative judges.  
Thus, this statement can be used to answer why a Democratic Senator with a liberal 
voting rating of 95 would vote to confirm two widely known conservative Justices to the 
Supreme Court (http://www.adaction.org/ADATodayVR2005.pdf).    
To aide with the analysis of Bryd’s votes, an examination of his statements made 
concerning the two nominations can be used to provide further evidence for Byrd’s 
voting.  For example, in announcing his views on Justice Alito, Byrd asserted that in his 
eyes, there was a substantial flaw in the nomination process, specifically within the 
Senate, and that fellow Senators should not take into account political party affiliations in 
their voting process.  He further stated how he “refuse(s) to simply toe the Party line 
when it comes to Supreme Court Justices”.   Additionally, Senator Bryd has also stated 
“It is imperative that the American people have faith in the Justices of the Supreme 
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Court.  To help ensure that belief, the Senate needs to do all that it can to avoid extreme 
partisan confirmation battles” (http://byrd.senate.gov/speeches/2006_january/alito.html).  
Interviews conducted with members of Alliance for Justice further can be tied Byrd’s 
bipartisan stance on judicial confirmation.  Specifically, Nan Aron asserted “Senator 
Bryd, generally speaking, defers to the President on judicial nomination and has always 
been one of the Democrats very reluctant to challenge a president either Democrat or 
Republican on judicial nominations”   (Nan Aron Interview 3/21/2007).  Thus, her 
statements, as well as those by Senator Byrd, can be used to summarize a major influence 
on Senator Byrd’s voting outcome in these two particular confirmation processes.  
 In summary, Senator Byrd’s voting tendencies, in terms of the Senate roll call 
votes, can be attributed to a combination of two specific variables.  These variables 
include home-state political concerns and his outlook on the confirmation process as a 
whole.  Home state concerns, whether simply representing the conservative appointment 
of judges to federal courts or reelection concerns, have shown to be a reason for the 
outcome of his two votes.  However, these home state concerns were not the only factor 
present in his decision to vote “yes” on both nominees.  Instead, these concerns combined 
with Byrd’s philosophy on the Senate’s role in the confirmation process of federal judges 
in general.  Further, Byrd has stated himself that he longs for a bipartisan effort to unite 
the Senate and confirm nominations.  Lastly, an interview with the Nan Aron suggests 
that as a whole, Senator Byrd defers to the President in terms of nominations to the Court. 
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Senator James Jeffords (I - VT) 
 Senator Jim Jeffords was born in Vermont on May 11, 1934.  Jeffords served in 
the Senate from 1988 through 2006 representing his birth state.  Due to the health of his 
wife, Jeffords decided to not run for reelection in 2006. 
(http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/04/21/jeffords_will_not_seek_reelecti
on/).  Jeffords was originally elected as a Republican candidate, but later became an 
Independent Senator in June of 2001.  During his tenure in the Senate, Jeffords was a 
member of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions, and the Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
(http://bioguide.congress.ov/scripts/biodisplay. pl?index=J000072).     
 Due to Jeffords’ Independent status, as well as his inconsistent voting on the two 
nominees, he was chosen for a case study.  However, it is important to note that although 
he was an independent, for purposes of this study, he was counted and treated as a 
Democrat.  This is due to the fact that he caucused with the Democrats.  He has an ADA 
rating of 90, making him quite liberal (http://www.adaction.org/ADATodayVR2005.pdf).  
Jeffords’ voting on the confirmation of the two Justices places him in category five of the 
data.  Specifically, he voted “yes” on Roberts and “no” on Alito, which, as explained 
previously, falls outside of the mode of data.  As with the analysis on Senator Bryd, 
statements made by Jeffords himself will be helpful in explaining his voting behavior.  In 
turn, these statements can be traced back to some of the overall conclusions discussed 
previously as to why the voting outcome was so different between the two nominees.  For 
example, in Jeffords’ statements concerning his vote on Chief Justice Roberts, he 
declared, “from the record we have, nobody has raised a question on whether Judge 
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Roberts has the proper legal experience or character to be the next Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court.  It also appears to me from a review of his judicial 
decisions that Judge Roberts has not allowed his personal beliefs or ideology to influence 
his decision-making process” (http://jeffords.senate.gov/~jeffords/press/05/09 
092805roberts_vote.html).  Jeffords also stated that he felt Justice Roberts further 
reinforced these thoughts in his statements to the Senate Judiciary Committee and while 
being questioned, he provided direct answers to these questions.  As argued in the 
previous pages, Justice Roberts’ lack of judicial record aided him in being confirmed 
with more ease than Alito.  Likewise, if Roberts would have had the same lengthy 
experience on the Circuit Court of Appeals as Alito had, perhaps these statements made 
by Jeffords would have been different in tone. 
Compare Jeffords’ statement on Roberts with a few concerning Alito’s 
confirmation.  For example, Jeffords asserted that if Alito were to be confirmed, he felt 
that “…our country would be ill-served by his judicial philosophy at this critical point in 
time.  This philosophy would grant too much authority to one branch of government at 
the expense of others” 
(http://jeffords.senate.gov/~jeffords/press/06/01/012606alitovote.html).  Jeffords also 
acknowledged, “While many of my colleagues will disagree with my assessment of 
Judge Alito, this will be a lifetime appointment and a lifetime is too long to be wrong” 
(http://jeffords.senate.gov/~jeffords/press/06/01/013006alito floorstatement. html).  
However, this statement seems puzzling due to the fact that both justices were 
conservative in nature.  Therefore, what accounts for the sudden change in the tone of the 
statements concerning the two nominations?  The answer lies, in part, in the availability 
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for Senators, including Jeffords, to examine Justice Alito’s lengthy history of judicial 
voting.  Therefore, Jeffords was able to make a judgment concerning the characterization 
of Alito’s judicial philosophy.  Moreover, he was able to point to the evidence to verify 
his characterizations.  Jeffords also expressed his concern over Alito’s deference to the 
executive branch, which is also examined in the previous pages.  In a time where bitter 
bipartisan battles were present over actions taken by President Bush, Alito’s past 
decisions further allowed for him to gain more opposition in the roll call votes.         
 Another reason for the difference in Jeffords’ voting relates to the idea of personal 
character of the two nominations.  Recall the discussion in the previous pages concerning 
the ability of Justice Roberts to capture an audience with his polished demeanor.  
Additionally, this trait was present during the hearings, allowing Senators to feel as 
though Roberts answered questions more directly than Alito did.  Jeffords addressed this 
issue when he stated “Judge Alito did not provide complete answers on many important 
topics the way now Chief Justice Roberts did during his nomination hearing” 
(http://jeffords.senate.gov/~jeffords/press/06/01/013006alito floorstatement.html).  This 
polish, or lack thereof, appears to have allowed for the nominees to leave differing 
impressions on the very Senate that votes to confirm them.     
 Lastly, former Senator Jeffords expressed concern over the notion of political 
balance on the Court and sighted this concern has having an impact on his “no” vote.  
Jeffords illustrated this concern directly when he declared “I have concluded that the 
addition of Judge Alito to the Supreme Court would unacceptably shift the balance of the 
Court on many critical questions facing our country…” 
(http://jeffords.senate.gov/~jeffords/press /06/01/013006alito floorstatement.html). 
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Replacing a conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist with a conservative Chief Justice 
Roberts would have little impact on the voting behavior of the Court as a whole.  
However, as previously discussed, the replacement of a moderate swing vote Justice 
O’Connor with a conservative Justice Alito had the ability to alter the overall political 
balance of the Court.  Clearly, Senators, including former Senator Jeffords took this 
notion into account, ultimately affecting his overall votes. 
 Concisely, as with Senator Byrd, a combination of distinct variables can be used 
to explain former Senator Jeffords’ voting behavior in the roll call votes for both 
nominees.  These variables include personality and character of the Justices, length and 
substance of judicial voting records, and political balance on the Court.  Chief Justice 
Roberts has shown to possess somewhat of an advantage over his colleague due to his 
personal character.  This edge clearly benefited him in his confirmation votes within the 
Senate.  Further, this argument is supported by the declarations that Jeffords made 
concerning the differences in the way he characterized both nominees during the 
hearings.  Justice Roberts’ lack of judicial record, and correspondingly Justice Alito’s 
extensive one, noticeably played a role in Jeffords’ overall voting on the two nominees.  
Due to Alito’s abundant record, Jeffords was able to point to past decisions in an effort to 
support his “no” vote.  Lastly, political balance was also key in Jeffords’ “no” vote to 
Alito and is further supported by previous statements Jeffords made.  
 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D – VT) 
 Senator Patrick Leahy was born on March 31st, 1940 in Middlesex Vermont 
(http://www.vote-smart.org/bio.php?can_id=S0890103).  Leahy was elected to the United 
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States Senate by the voters of Vermont in 1974, and is the youngest Democrat to serve in 
the Senate from Vermont.  He is a ranking member on the Judiciary Committee, as well 
as a member of the Homeland Security Defense and Interior Subcommittees.  He was 
heavily involved with the USA Patriot Act, where had ensured the addition of checks and 
balances to the bill.  In addition, Leahy is concerned with the flaws of the capital 
punishment system in the United States and is the principal backer of the Innocence 
Protection Act (http://leahy.senate.gov/biography/sketch07index.html). 
 Senator Leahy was chosen for this case study for the reason that he has a larger 
role in the confirmation process as a whole.  Likewise, he was also chosen due to his vote 
of “yes” on Roberts and “no” on Alito.  This voting discrepancy places him outside the 
mode of Senate roll call data, thus making him of interest to the study as a whole.  
Moreover, Senator Leahy was the first among his fellow Democratic Senators to support 
President Bush’s nomination of Judge Roberts.   This is quite startling due to the fact that 
his ADA rating is 100, making him extremely supportive of the values of the liberal 
group, Americans for Democratic Action 
(http://www.votesmart.org/issue_rating_detail.php?sig_id=004110M).  Therefore, the 
question becomes, as with Senator Jeffords, why would Leahy vote differently on two 
nominations who were both conservative in nature?   Dr. Elliot Slotnick’s interview with 
a high raking Democratic counsel to a Senate Judiciary Committee member, provides 
insight into the discrepancies between Leahy’s voting on the two nominees.   
The counsel explained how Senator Leahy felt that the next Chief Justice should 
not be decided on the basis of political party affiliation.  He also stated how Leahy spent 
a lot of time on the Roberts’ nomination, specifically spending personal time with him 
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and critically evaluating his responses at the hearings.  However, the counsel did not 
discuss these same factors in terms of Alito (Slotnick Interview).  In addition, Leahy 
himself states that his conscience led him to his “yes” vote on Roberts and that he “took 
Judge Roberts at his word when he gave the Committee assurances that he would respect 
Congressional authority” (http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200509/092605.html).  Leahy 
also stated that both he and Roberts shared appreciation for Justice Robert Jackson, which 
further enabled Roberts to secure a “yes” vote from Leahy 
((http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200509/092605.html).  These statements can be tied to the 
discussion regarding Robert’s character and his ability to captivate and win over the very 
Senators who would ultimately vote to confirm him.  Likewise, the personal time spent 
between the two further enabled Roberts’ character to shine through and help confirm a 
“yes” vote for himself.  Alito, as illustrated in the preceding pages, did not have these 
polished attributes, which can used, in part, to explain Leahy’s “no” vote on him.       
  Other variables that were influential in Leahy’s decision to vote “yes” on Roberts 
were the political balance of the Court, Roberts’ lack of judicial record, and his deferment 
to the executive branch.  With the lack of a judicial record, Leahy was able to trust in 
Robert’s words and thus vote to confirm him.  Thus, if Roberts would have had the same 
extensive record as that of Alito, his statements may not have been seen as credible to 
Senator Leahy.  Leahy made statements concerning Judge Alito’s record and his 
disapproval of his judicial decisions.  The Senator stated “We know that Judge Alito has 
advocated his personal legal view about the Unitary Executive theory in public remarks 
he made just a few years ago, as a sitting judge” 
(http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200601/011106.html).  This statement illustrates the notion 
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that although Alito may have said differently in his meetings and hearings, ultimately it 
was his record that would serve as his own political litmus test.   
Leahy’s statement can also be tied to another key variable used to explain Leahy’s 
voting, the issue of executive deference.  Separation of powers, with an emphasis on a 
Judicial Branch that is independent to that of the Executive, is a very important facet of 
the American government to Senator Leahy.  Consequentially, Leahy was able to use 
Alito’s record in an effort to support his “no” vote due to his uneasiness with Alito’s 
disproportionately strong support of the executive branch.  Additionally a critically 
important event transpired during Alito’s nomination that spawned criticism from Leahy:   
President Bush admitted to the warrantless electronic surveillance that he personally 
authorized.  This further enabled Leahy to see Alito as an actor in a governmental process 
that would continue to support the same such executive actions that he strongly 
disapproved of. 
Senator Leahy alluded to the concept of political balance in the Court during his 
statement on the Nomination of Roberts.  Leahy asserted “With this vote, I do not intend 
to lend my support to an effort by this President to move the Supreme Court and the law 
radically to the right.  Above all, balance and moderation on the Court are crucial” 
(http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200509/092105.html).  These words suggest that Leahy 
possibly did not think that Roberts’ replacement of Rehnquist would alter the principle 
political make-up of the Court.  On the contrary, Leahy stated “As the Senate prepares to 
vote on President Bush’s current nomination – his third – for a successor to Justice 
O’Connor, we should be mindful of her critical role on the Supreme Court.  Her legacy is 
one of fairness that I want to see preserved.  Justice O’Connor has been a guardian of the 
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protections the Constitution provides the American people” and that “no President should 
be allowed to pack the courts” (http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200601/013006b.html).  
Leahy made no reference explicitly to the difference in replacement of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist by Judge Roberts.  Therefore, political balance on the Court was taken into 
account in the voting roll calls by Senator Leahy. 
In sum, it seems as though three key factors can be used to explain the difference 
in of Senator Leahy’s votes among the two Justices:  the political balance on the Court, 
the personnel character of the Justices, and judicial philosophy in terms of judicial 
executive deferment. Ultimately, it was Roberts’ polished and eloquent character that 
helped garner him a “yes” vote from Leahy.  Conversely, Alito’s extensive record and 
judicial philosophy are what accounted for the decision of Leahy to vote “no” on his 
confirmation.   
 
Senator Lincoln Chafee (R - RI) 
    Former Senator Lincoln Chafee was born on March 26, 1953 in Warwick, R.I.  He 
served as Rhode Island’s Junior Senator from November, 1999 to January, 2007. 
However, Chafee’s path to the Senate differs from those in the previous three case 
studies.  Specifically, due to the death of his father, and consequently the vacancy in the 
Senate that his death left, Chafee was appointed to replacement for his father’s seat.  He 
was ultimately unsuccessful in his 2006 attempt at reelection 
(http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/members/c001040/).  During his tenure in 
the Senate, Chafee served on the Environment and Public Works Committee 
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(http://epw.senate.gov/members/members.htm) and the Foreign Relations Committee 
(http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001629.php). 
In relation to this study, Chafee voted “yes” on Roberts and “no” on Alito.  
Moreover, he was the only Republican Senator to do so.  This out of ordinary voting 
behavior places him well outside the mode of data and thus, he falls into Category 6.  
Moreover, this former Senator is known for disagreeing with members of the Republican 
Party and has been labeled as a moderate Republican by many.  Examples of this can be 
seen by looking into Chafee’s voting record.  Specifically, Chafee opposed domestic 
wiretapping and “was the only Senate Republican to oppose the Iraq war resolution” 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/13/AR200604130 
017).  By looking at his ADA rating, a more comprehensive outlook of his political 
ideology and voting patterns can be extracted; Chafee registered an ADA rating of 75. 
Moreover, he was considered the most liberal Republican by the organization 
(http://www.adaction.org/ADATodayVR2005.pdf).  Thus, although he is a member of 
the Republican Party, he was still rather liberal in his voting.  This rating, moreover, can 
account for one reason as to why he was the only Republican Senator to not offer support 
for Alito.  For these reasons, Chafee was chosen as a case study.   
As with the preceding three Senators used as case studies, Chafee made 
statements on the congressional record and in the media concerning his positions on both 
Roberts and Alito.  As one would expect, these statements differed in tone depending on 
the nominee.  In terms of Roberts, Chafee stated “…Judge Roberts is an extraordinary 
accomplished man with the right temperament” 
(http://chafee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?IsPrint=true&FuseAction=Speeches.Details).  
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Contrast these statements with those made by Chafee concerning the nomination of Alito.  
He asserted “The President did win the election…I am a pro-choice, pro-environment, 
pro-Bill of Rights Republican, and I will be voting against this nomination” 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/30/politics/politicsspecial1/30cnd-alito.html).  Chafee 
also stated that “In particular, I carefully examined his record on Executive Power, 
women’s reproductive freedoms and the commerce clause of Article one, Section Eight 
of the Constitution…Judge Roberts was willing to call Roe vs. Wade ‘settled law’ but 
Judge Alito refused to make a similar statement.” 
(http://chafee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Print&PressReleas
e).  
I had the pleasure of interviewing former Senator Chafee via telephone and was 
able to directly inquire about his voting behavior.  He confirmed the above statements, as 
well as offered other explanations for his voting behavior.  This method of interviewing 
the actual individual who cast the votes allows for more accurate information to be 
analyzed and offered in support of the central thesis.  In general, Chafee stated that, in 
terms of placing his two votes, he “took the politics out of it”.  He stated that he knew 
that his votes would anger the citizens in Rhode Island on both sides of the political 
spectrum, and he tried to remove the politics from the process and voted the way that he 
felt was best.  Specifically, I asked him why he voted “yes” on Roberts.  Chafee 
responded that the American voting public had spoken when they elected President Bush 
into office and that his “yes” vote was a reflection of this.  Moreover, he responded that 
due to the fact that Bush was voted into office and was now the leader of this country, his 
“yes” vote was a type of deferment to the elected leader of this country.       
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In terms of his “no” vote on Alito, Chafee asserted that there were key variables 
that affected the outcome of his vote.  The variables that he stated included balance on 
the court, the issue of the commerce clause, abortion and civil liberties.  As discussed 
previously, replacing Justice O’Conner with Alito affected the political balance of the 
Court.  Moreoever, Chafee stated that this notion heavily played in the outcome of his 
decision.  Chafee also stated that the issues of abortion, civil liberties and the commerce 
clause were important in his decisions.  In addition, he explained that he even worked 
with fellow Senator Olympia Snowe (R – Maine) on the pro-choice abortion front during 
Alito’s nomination in an effort to raise awareness for Alito’s anti-abortion stance.  During 
the interview, he explained that these factors would be jeopardized if Alito was voted 
onto the Supreme Court and that, consequently, they also affected his “no” decision.   
Lastly, the interview ended with responses to questions concerning the outcome 
and backlash of his voting.  Chafee stated that following his “no” vote on Alito, he 
received telephone calls from fellow members of the Republican Party stating that they 
were done with him.  He does not, however, attribute his recent election loss to his “no” 
vote on Alito and stated that the people of Rhode Island were simply more affiliated with 
the Democratic rather than the Republican Party (Chafee Interview 3/14/2007).   
In conclusion, former Senator Chafee is an interesting part of the roll call 
population in that he was the only Republican to vote “no” on Alito.  His behavior, 
nonetheless, can be explained by public statements and my interview.  In terms of his 
vote on Roberts, Chafee himself explained it as a vote respecting the American public’s 
action of voting President Bush into office.  On the contrary, Chafee asserted that there 
were key influences that account for his “no” vote.  These variables included the political 
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balance on the Court, abortion, civil liberties, and commerce clause issues.  Likewise, 
Chafee felt that Alito would threaten these issues and protections afforded to the 
American public. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, although both justices are from the conservative wing of the 
ideological spectrum, a 20 vote discrepancy still exists in their Senate roll call votes.  
This discrepancy can be explained with the overall hypothesis for the study, which asserts 
that a combination of variables, rather than one single factor, accounts for the 
discrepancy in the Senate roll call votes following both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito’s confirmation hearings.  Moreover, this central argument is supported within the 
previous pages.  These variables include: the character and personality of the nominees, 
judicial philosophy, the timing of their nominations, the record created by their prior 
written opinions, interest group politics and the political balance on the court at the time 
of their nominations.  One variable, however, that I thought would make a difference was 
the concept of Presidential approval ratings but its effect on the confirmation of a 
nominee did not prove to affect the outcome of the two roll call votes.  The 
aforementioned influential variables, however, combined in a variety of facets to 
influence both confirmation processes.  Although these variables differed from Senator to 
Senator, which can be seen examining the four diverse case studies, they all ultimately 
affected the Senate roll call votes on the two Justices.   
As a whole, a number of statements elevate themselves to the forefront in 
summing up the principle issues at hand. The elevation of Roberts to succeed Rehnquist 
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failed to alter the political makeup of the Court with respect voting alignment, thus 
significantly easing the process by which he was confirmed.  The general consensus 
among the Senators at the time of the Roberts confirmation that in the unexpected event 
of a second seat becoming open, this second nominee (which ultimately proved to be 
Alito) offered up would be a more moderate choice also played a role in the Roberts 
voting. Roberts’ lack of a lengthy judicial record further allowed him to be perceived as a 
judicial question mark.  Hurricane Katrina also aided in what resulted by shifting the 
attention of both the Senate and the American public, thus allowing Roberts to be 
confirmed with greater speed and ease.  Additionally, Alito lacked the polish and 
engaging personality that Roberts has and Roberts had more contacts within the 
Washington D.C. legal community than Alito did.  Finally, Alito’s lengthy 15 year 3rd 
Circuit Court record allowed opponents from the ideological left to extract voting 
tendencies and bring his more controversial rulings to the attention of the public.  On one 
parting note, one way to further this topic of interest would be to compare the next 
vacancy’s nomination on the Supreme Court with those of Chief Justice Roberts’ and 
Justice Alito’s.  Perhaps with a further enhanced sample size in addition to the presence 
of other variables, a more comprehensive picture of the confirmation process as a whole 
would emerge and further support this research.  
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